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THE ROLE OF CANADA'S PRAIRIE PROVINCES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND PARLIAMENTARY
REFORM

HOWARD CODY
I make a necessarily tentative effort to consider
the interests and involvement of one of Canada's regions, the Prairie Provinces of Alberta,
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, at the present
stage of the ongoing constitutional reform process.
The search for a new constitutional formula
has assumed a sense of urgency, with a specified
deadline. The Meech Lake accord would have
entrenched in the constitution the designation
of French-speaking Quebec as a "distinct society." Many English Canadians, exemplified by
Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells, believed
that this provision would have assigned to Quebec potentially extensive powers denied to the
other provinces. Accordingly the Meech Lake
accord was widely unpopular in English Canada
and remains so. As the June 1990 deadline for
unanimous provincial legislative ratification approached, the Newfoundland and Manitoba
legislatures refused their assent. In reaction
Quebec's government has proposed to stage a
referendum on political sovereignty by late October 1992 unless English Canada offers by that
time an acceptable formula for a redesigned federation. Quebec expects considerably strengthened powers in any new federation; its
government already has identified twenty-two

Canada's federation always has been tentative.
This motley collection of French and English
speakers, multiculturals and Native peoples, extended across a narrow ribbon of land just above
the border with the United States, seems eternally fated to endure tension and uncertainty
concerning its national identity and political
institutions. This uncertainty may now have
reached its highest point in Canada's history.
The 1990 failure of the Meech Lake constitutional accord, which was intended to bring
Quebec voluntarily into Canada's 1982 constitution, has inspired an unprecedented quest for
new constitutional provisions acceptable to Canadians throughout the country. 1 In this paper
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desired new exclusive jurisdictions as its negotiating position. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's government presented its own twenty-eight
point bargaining position in September 1991.
Among other provisions it would enhance federal control over Canada's economic union but
allow provinces to negotiate with Ottawa greater
autonomy over culture and other fields. Inevitably a redesigned federation would greatly affect all of Canada, not simply Quebec or the
Quebec-Ottawa relationship. All segments of
Canadian society and all regions of the country
must recognize and advance their interests in
the constitutional reform process. 2
At this juncture the stakes for the Prairies
are especially high. The region occupies the vast
and often unforgiving territory between prosperous Pacific Rim-oriented British Columbia
and industrialized "fat-cat" Ontario. Most prairie Canadians desire a well-financed and internationally credible federal government in
Ottawa. Only a respected Canada can market
prairie grain, potash, and oil and supply "deficiency" payments and other supports that may
be necessitated by poor world grain markets or
low prices. At the same time, the thinly populated Prairies remain alienated from the distant
and majoritarian-oriented federal government
and feel themselves powerless to affect national
policymaking allegedly dominated for more than
a century by the huge central provinces of Ontario and Quebec. 3 Thus, prairie Canadians wish
to keep a united Canada with a strong federal
government while they simultaneously enhance
prairie influence in national politics. This is a
formidable dual assignment.
Complicating the Prairies' approach to the
constitutional crisis is western Canada's growing economic bifurcation. Alberta and British
Columbia become steadily wealthier while
Manitoba and Saskatchewan stagnate. Statistics Canada reports that between 1970 and 1989
Alberta's share of Canada's gross domestic product rose faster than any other province's, while
Manitoba's and Saskatchewan's shares declined
faster than any other province's. A recent study
of Manitoba and Saskatchewan urban centers
blames federal government policies for "no

growth or actual economic shrinkage even before the recession" in the two provinces. It warns
that "without major economic retooling, Manitoba and Saskatchewan ... may soon become
little more than hapless adjuncts to the (also
distressed) U.S. regions of the northern plains."4
In this paper I have utilized interviews with
members of Canada's House of Commons (MPs)
to address these issues. I interviewed eighteen
Prairie MPs in their Ottawa offices in May 1991
to ascertain their perspectives on their own provincial and regional interests in the looming
constitutional talks. I also asked respondents for
their suggestions and preferences for constitutional change and parliamentary reform. Eight
of the respondents come from Alberta, six are
Manitobans, and four represent Saskatchewan
constituencies. By party the respondents include eight Progressive Conservatives (Prime
Minister Brian Mulroney's party), five New
Democrats (social democratic party), three Liberals, one Reform (right-wing western party)
and one Independent.
THE PRAIRIES IN CANADA TODAY

Canada is a highly regionalized country.
Canada's existing Senate, party caucuses in the
House of Commons, some proposed formulas
for constitutional amendments and Senate reform, and statistical information, are all organized on the basis of four or five regions. Atlantic
Canada, Quebec, Ontario, and the West (or,
sometimes, the Prairie Provinces and British
Columbia separately) all enjoy regional status.
This preoccupation with regional categories
works against the Prairies. Western Canada is
not nearly as homogenous as the four uniformly
poor Atlantic provinces, much less the regionprovinces of Quebec and Ontario. Moreover,
there remains the disputed British Columbia
perception that the Pacific province should be
classified as a fifth region of its own. British
Columbia's semi-apartness enhances the West's
diversity and further impairs the coherence of
western contributions to national political life.
Complicating this matter still further is the
growing belief in Alberta that the province
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should forsake its prairie neighbors to forge an
alliance with British Columbia in its dealings
with federal authorities. 5
Even when we consider British Columbia a
separate region, the three Prairie Provinces diverge sharply in their economic and political
interests and especially in their fiscal relationships with Ottawa. Alberta is Canada's wealthiest province in respect to its independent fiscal
capacity. It enjoys a much greater ability to raise
revenues from its own sources (mostly oil and
natural gas) than does any other province. Manitoba, most of whose residents live in economically stagnant Winnipeg, falls well into the
"have-not" category of provinces that receive
substantial "equalization" benefits from Ottawa
to help them to provide services near national
average levels. Grain and potash exporting Saskatchewan requires protection from the vagaries
of weather and markets as well as equalization
benefits. Until recently the "boom or bust" central Prairies occasionally enjoyed high incomes
from grain sales, but the near collapse of overseas markets has forced Saskatchewan to rely
heavily on federal grain "deficiency" payments,
which approximated $2 billion in 1991 alone,
and grain prices reminiscent of the 1920s mean
that prairie farmers "are going to need substantial help from Canadian taxpayers" for some
time to come. Inevitably Manitoba and Saskatchewan, but not Alberta, have become
steadily more dependent on federal assistance
since the 1970s. 6 Fiscal disparities alone can
make Alberta appear to be "another country,"
as a Winnipeg Liberal MP described the province. A rural Saskatchewan New Democrat went
further, claiming that oil wealth has helped to
"Americanize" Alberta in respect to its values
and political culture.
The sharp intraregional divergences cause the
Prairie Provinces to advance quite different interests or similar interests in unequal ways. When
prairie provincial governments pursue "beggarthy-neighbor" policies, Alberta enjoys distinct
advantages. To cite one instance among many,
a rural Manitoba Conservative complained that
Alberta subsidizes its meat packing industry
through tax concessions that other Prairie Prov-
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inces cannot afford, thereby luring meat packing plants elsewhere in the West to move to
Alberta. The same respondent admitted that
the Conservative Party's western regional caucus in Parliament finds it "hard to function"
under these circumstances.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the perception that the Prairies are "simply growing apart,"
Winnipeg Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy recently
appealed for the Prairie Provinces to coordinate
their policies respecting grain pools, telecommunications systems, energy planning, the environment, and higher education. Such
cooperation could enhance efficiency, increase
bargaining power in constitutional and other
national policymaking, and improve competitiveness in international trade. Presumably the
region could benefit from enhanced international credibility, especially in the struggle
against the European Community's agricultural
subsidies. (On the other hand, a rural Saskatchewan respondent observed that the greatest obstacle to Canadian grain sales is the fact that
Europe has become a net exporter of food.) In
any case the early political and media responses
to the Axworthy appeal were favorable but predictably pessimistic about the chances for increased interprovincial cooperation on the
Prairies. 7
RESTRUCTURING THE CANADIAN
FEDERATION: DIVISION OF POWERS

With the present constitution apparently
discredited, Canadians face six broad options
for their federal system. The options are offered
here in two groups, three of which maintain
the principle of provincial equality and three of
which repudiate it. Each group is presented from
the most to the least centralized. The options
are rebalanced federalism, asymmetric (or
checkerboard) federalism, general decentralization, special status federalism, sovereignty-association federalism (or institutionalized
bipolarity), and full Quebec sovereignty.
Three options would perpetuate provincial
equality in principle if not in practice. Rebalanced federalism would reallocate several fed-
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era I and provincial jurisdictions that supposedly
could be exercised more efficiently at the other
level. Federal authority over free movement of
people, goods, and services could be strengthened in return for, say, full provincial freedom
over health and other social services. In the
second option, asymmetric or checkerboard federalism, all ten provinces would be offered wholly
new powers, such as unemployment insurance,
and the complete freedom Quebec demands in
at least some of the fields now shared with Ottawa, such as health, energy, environment, industry, income tax, social and family services,
communications, agriculture, manpower, regional economic development, and language.
Because provinces could pick and choose from
the available offerings, some provinces would
potentially retain much more extensive responsibilities and a very different relationship with
Ottawa than others, but officially all provinces
would remain constitutionally equal. Canada
already possesses various asymmetric arrangements. 8 Under general decentralization, most
or all of the above jurisdictions would be fully
entrusted to all ten provinces whether they
wanted them or not. Canada would then approximate a confederation whose member states
have equal powers.
The other three options would place Quebec, and only Quebec, in a distinct power position. Special status federalism, which appears
to be the preference of the Quebec government,
would extend full control over many jurisdictions to Quebec alone, leaving Ottawa still partially or wholly concerned with these activities
in the other provinces. Quebec would remain
as a province, enjoying continued federal assistance and parliamentary representation. Sovereignty-association or institutionalized
bipolarity, the objective of Quebec's opposition
Parti Quebecois, would have Quebec assume
legal sovereignty and, its proponents hope, enjoy the trappings of an independent state such
as membership in the United Nations. A formal
economic association with Canada would continue to exist, however, to administer a common currency and some sort of economic union
through joint institutions. Finally, under full

Quebec sovereignty, supported by the relatively
few extreme Quebec sovereigntists, Canada and
Quebec would maintain no greater institutional
integration than Canada and the United States.
Many functional links would remain possible,
including free trade.
Put briefly, prairie MPs suggested that their
region wishes Canada to remain united, with
all provinces on an equal constitutional footing,
and much, although not necessarily all, existing
federal authority retained. They would accept
either rebalanced federalism or asymmetric federalism, particularly if federal supervision of the
national economy and valued national institutions, such as the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation, were preserved. The options that
explicitly recognize Quebec's distinctiveness
with special powers for Quebec alone encounter
vigorous resistance in the West. They are widely
interpreted as yet another outrage in which only
Quebec gets what it wants while the legitimate
concerns of other provinces are ignored. On the
other hand, most prairie MPs believe that the
confederal general decentralization option offers a formula for national disintegration. Even
Alberta Conservatives in Parliament-although not necessarily their provincial government-believe that a radically attenuated federal
government would damage Canadians' national
identity and allegiance. Saskatchewan and
Manitoba respondents fear that a weak federal
government would prove unable or unwilling
to subsidize their provinces or to market their
products abroad. This last concern is most acute
in Saskatchewan, which already suffers from the
same farm and small-town depopulation as the
plains states south of the border. According to
Robert Sheppard,
nearly 85,000 people, mostly young and educated, have left the province in the past
five years. According to some accounts,
nearly 1,000 farms have vanished each year
since 1982, and with them have gone the
jobs at the repair shops and machinery outlets, and the vibrancy of many small towns. 9
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Mindful of these perceptions, the Mulroney
government has presented a proposal that combines features of rebalanced and asymmetric federalism. The program includes essentially four
provisions in this respect: Parliament would gain
sweeping new authority to make laws that it
declares necessary for the efficient functioning
of the economic union, subject to the assent of
seven provinces with fifty percent of Canada's
population; a new mostly provincially appointed Council of the Federation would ratify
certain federal economic policies on the same
"7/50" basis; the provinces would receive the
"non-national" residual powers now assigned to
Parliament plus labor market training; and the
current asym!lletry between provinces' powers
would increase as Ottawa "delegates" various
federal responsibilities, such as culture and immigration, through separate arrangements with
each province, while provinces also "opt out"
from federal spending programs (with compensation) and from federal initiatives designed to
advance the efficient functioning of the economic union. The first two of these provisions
are given little chance of surviving the coming
negotiations.
A different version of asymmetry, unmentioned in the federal proposals but popular with
many senior Canadian political leaders, is
"CPP," or concurrency (shared federal and provincial jurisdiction) with provincial paramountcy (supremacy). 10 This system could prove
more far-reaching than the federal proposals.
Under this arrangement, each province would
be offered the same extensive "menu" of new
powers that Quebec is now demanding, and
some new tax jurisdiction to fund them, with
final provincial authority wherever each province chooses. For example, if, as is likely, communications were to appear on this list, a
province could accept existing federal policy or
implement its own communications policy
whatever Ottawa or other provinces wished. A
senior Alberta Conservative respondent called
asymmetric arrangements available to all provinces an essential element of a "face-saving"
deal for the West, as Quebec would presumably
make much more frequent use of delegation or
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provincial paramountcy than the other provinces. Through this device, each province could
secure an informal special status in accordance
with its self-defined interests while all ten provinces theoretically remained equal. The Mulroney government acknowledges the influence
of David Milne's recent essay on its consideration of concurrency with provincial paramountcy.11 "Rebalancing" provisions to
strengthen federal enforcement of free movement from province to province could be incorporated into a delegation or CPP formula.
Concurrency with provincial paramountcy is
tempting as a resolution to Canada's constitutional predicament. For Quebec to accept this
arrangement, the menu of available new provincial responsibilities would have to be lengthy
and inclusive. Quebec would probably assume
all possible jurisdictions, but power-hungry
provinces elsewhere, also exasperated with perceived federal "interference" in their affairs,
probably would seek delegation or paramountcy
only in so much as they could afford it. Accordingly, two broad classes of provinces could
result: Quebec and the three wealthiest provinces, Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta,
likely would take over many more jurisdictions
than the other provinces, including Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The Atlantic provinces,
Canada's poorest, would undertake the fewest
responsibilities. A similar scenario also could
unfold under the federal proposals, especially if
"culture" is defined very broadly.
Questions inevitably arise from such an arrangement: If wealthy provinces assume the taxraising capability to fund their new responsibilities, where will Ottawa find the money to
finance these services in the "have-not" provinces, which are now funded primarily by the
richer provinces? Albertans contend that their
province "lost" at least $50 billion in the 1970s
and early 1980s when Ottawa forced them to
sell their oil to the rest of Canada at prices well
below world levels. Yet what would have happened to the national fabric if Alberta had gained
this additional revenue at the expense of other
provinces' residents? John Dafoe uses 1988 figures to show how fiscal federalism differentially
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affects the provinces. In that year Alberta paid
$1688 per capita more in federal taxes than it
received in federal services. By contrast, Saskatchewan and Manitoba respectively received
$1845 and $1521 more than they paid. 11
Might Ottawa not become as crippled fiscally
by CPP formula as in general decentralization?
If each province exercised different powers, how
would their MPs and cabinet ministers operate
in Ottawa? Would they participate in federal
policymaking involving jurisdictions that their
own provinces had assumed completely? What
about federal tax policies that would affect each
province differently, some more so than others?
Milne addresses the foregoing questions, but not
those that follow. In any event his assurance
that each province will be satisfied with its continued participation in federal policymaking on
the current representational basis, because concurrency with provincial paramountcy leaves the
provinces theoretically equal, is not entirely
convincing. Indeed, might not CPP or the federal proposals allow the great majority of MPs
and cabinet ministers who are from larger provinces to dominate federal policymaking in matters disproportionately or exclusively affecting
the smaller provinces? How would the smaller
provinces react to this situation?
There is another question: Is there a successful asymmetric federation in operation today? The answer is yes. Malaysia gives Sarawak
and Sabah, on Borneo, some powers not exercised by the states in peninsular Malaysia. The
Bornean states enjoy full representation in the
Kuala Lumpur parliament, but they have relatively few people and small parliamentary representation. There is no existing or historical
example of the concurrency with provincial paramountcy variation of asymmetric federalism.
RESTRUCTURING THE CANADIAN
FEDERATION : PARLIAMENT

While a reallocation of jurisdictional powers
constitutes Quebec's overriding objective in
Canada's constitutional crisis, residents of the
Prairie Provinces consider parliamentary reform
a more urgent priority. As the right-wing pop-

ulist Reform Party puts it, "the West wants in,"
namely access to power over federal policymaking. This access can only be assured through
parliamentary reform, especially reform of the
presently appointive and ineffectual Senate, to
offset Ontario and Quebec's majoritarian dominance of the House of Commons. II Recall that
a senior Alberta Conservative observed that the
West may be persuaded to accept delegation or
concurrency with provincial paramountcy as part
of a face-saving arrangement. The other, possibly indispensable, component of this deal
would be Senate reform. Since 1985 Alberta's
provincial government has led the movement
for an all-new "Triple E" Senate. This chamber
would be elected, effective, and have equal representation per province, much like the upper
houses in Australia and the United States. Public opinion polls routinely report that more than
seventy percent of westerners desire a Triple E
Senate. 14
Senate reform presents a daunting array of
difficulties, both in implementation and operation. There are problems attending all
components of Triple E, especially equal representation per province. Despite the Australian and United States provisions for small state
power through a Triple E Senate, or more likely
because of the observed results of these practices, the governments of Ontario and especially Quebec lack enthusiasm for an
arrangement in which their provinces, with 60
percent of Canada's population, would supply
only 20 percent of the senators. Largely for this
reason, the new federal proposals call only for
a "more equitable" distribution of Senate seats,
without providing any definition of "equitable. "
A new Senate's potential effectiveness is also
controversial. Even Alberta proposes a mere
suspensive (temporary) veto over most legislation and no veto at all over money bills. Under
the federal proposal, the Senate would have no
legislative role in raising or spending money but
a six-month suspensive veto over matters of national importance such as national defense and
international issues and a full veto on other
legislation. Some Senate reformers maintain that
there is little point in pursuing Senate reform
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unless the new chamber's powers and credibility
approach those of the House of Commons. 1\
Moreover, there are disagreements over procedures for electing senators. Alberta wants all
senators elected provincewide under the familiar plurality (first-past-the-post) system. Some
other reformers prefer senatorial districts inside
provinces or proportional representation. The
federal proposals specify only that senators be
elected at the same time as MPs. Before Senate
reform can be implemented, these and other
details will require reconciliation of widely varying conceptions of the role and character of a
new upper house.
Prairie MPs betray markedly less enthusiasm
for Senate reform than their constituents. Many
MPs, both New Democrats and Conservatives,
would like the upper house abolished altogether. Understandably they perceive a strong
Senate as an unwelcome limitation on their
own chamber's powers. They also suspect that
Ontario and Quebec will never accept Triple
E. Moreover, one Alberta Conservative openly
predicted that the seven "have-not" provinces
would dominate a Triple E Senate. He believed
that they would exploit any such chamber to
induce Ottawa to transfer additional revenues
from wealthy provinces like his own to poorer
provinces such as Saskatchewan and Manitoba.
Thus, a Triple E Senate would undermine Alberta's interests but not those of the other Prairie Provinces. Additionally some MPs of all
parties believe that a Triple E upper house blurs
the cabinet's clear responsibility to the lower
house, which is a long-cherished hallmark of
the British-derived Westminster parliamentary
system. Many Canadians believe that crises
generated by Australia's Senate, especially the
1975 affair that culminated in the dismissal of
the government, suggests the inadvisability of
a strong upper house in a Westminster parliament.
Despite these reservations, many MPs concede that public pressure and growing support
for the Reform Party may force creation of a
"Double E" (elected and effective) Senate that
would replace equal representation per province
with roughly equal representation per region or
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a population-sensitive apportionment by province. This might mollify Ontario and Quebec,
but under regional near-equality the divergent
interests of the Prairie Provinces would neutralize much of the region's influence. British
Columbia's claim to represent a region of its
own also would have to be addressed in a regionally oriented Senate, as would the divisive
issues relating to powers and electoral arrangements. Yet the specter of a Reform breakthrough in the next election, due by the end
of 1993, displacing dozens of sitting MPs of all
other parties, especially Conservatives, apparently has concentrated the minds and overcome
the misgivings of the Mulroney government and
many MPs of all parties on the Senate reform
issue. 16 Surely Reform's right-wing program,
which combines drastic reductions in federal
taxes and social programs with an Americanstyle electoral system, contributes to the consensus that the Reform threat must be countered.
Public support for Senate reform closely accompanies public exasperation with the negative and polarized environment, the narrow
partisanship, and the publicly unaccountable
voting behavior characteristic of the House of
Commons. A highly placed Alberta Conservative confessed that Canadians-perhaps
Westerners above all-are "fed up" and want
MPs to "clean up the place." The Reform platform calls for MPs to operate without party discipline on all votes in committees and on the
House floor, in line with constituency opinion. 17 This runs utterly contrary to the familiar
party-dominant parliamentary norms in Canada
and other Westminster parliaments. The Conservative government and the major opposition
parties are gradually, and grudgingly, preparing
to offer backbenchers a much wider range of
"free votes" in order to weaken Reform's appeal
and to avert those still greater American-style
evils that Reform also proposes, namely frequent referenda and the recall of elected officials. Accordingly the federal proposals vaguely
endorse more free votes for individual MPs.
The Commons reform process, which requires no constitutional amendments, has been
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under way for some time. Since the late 1960s,
but especially since 1986, MPs have acquired
increasingly independent standing committees
and better personal and committee staff support. 18 While Commons reform is universally
acclaimed as an enhancement of MPs' general
usefulness if not their policymaking power, there
remains strong opposition in all parties-except
Reform-to such an extension of freedom that
Canadian MPs come to resemble members of
the United States Congress. The features of
Congress that the MPs I interviewed liked least
are what they perceive as party weakness and
interest group domination. Parliamentary reformers of both Canadian chambers will endeavor to prevent these evils from extending to
Canada. Consistent with the Saskatchewan
MP's description of Alberta as the most Americanized province, Conservative Alberta MPs
admitted some admiration for the congressional
practices of nonpartisan logrolling and the relatively open committee investigations and bargaining over legislation. Most respondents of
all three major parties, however, still treasure
party caucus solidarity. They insisted that parties must be seen clearly to "stand for something" and that MPs should unconditionally
declare themselves "in" or "out" on every issue.
Those who even occasionally take the "out"
position, opposing party policy, earned such epithets as "unreliables" and "flakes." MPs cannot
be expected to assert much independence from
party policy when confronted with a choice between collegial acceptance and social ostracism,
even if more "free votes" are theoretically permitted in the future.

CONCLUSION

What lies ahead for the Prairies? We cannot
expect a coordinated regional strategy in constitutional negotiations. Saskatchewan and
Manitoba will seek to protect federal fiscal
power, while Alberta, possibly joining British
Columbia, will favor substantial tax and jurisdictional decentralization. Alberta seeks Senate
reform plus autonomy over energy (including
royalties) and taxes. Senate reform on a Triple

E model retains its allure throughout the region.
Thanks to Quebec's sovereigntist potential and
Reform's electoral threat, the likeliest outcomes
include increasingly asymmetric federalism
through delegation or concurrency with provincial paramountcy, a strengthening of the
wealthiest provinces at Ottawa's expense, Senate reform on a Double E model (but with no
absolute veto over all legislation), and limited
enhancement of backbench MPs' independence
from party leaders' control. Prairie public opinion and all of the MPs interviewed for this paper
probably could accept this package, but on the
whole only Alberta in the region would benefit
from it.
Indeed, the long-term outlook for Saskatchewan and Manitoba (and the Atlantic provinces) is not encouraging. All of the "have-not"
provinces may soon be left largely to their own
devices as early victims of a more decentralized
federalism. Ottawa policymakers may ask: "Why
should-and how can-we keep paying Prairie
farmers billions to produce (or not produce)
grain that we cannot sell?" Delegation or concurrency with provincial paramountcy would
raise these and other questions relating to new
federal jurisdictional and fiscal limitations and
the perceived inefficiency and futility of equalization and other support programs. Surely a
Triple E or even a Double E Senate could enhance prairie participation in federal policymaking, but it would prove cruelly ironic if less
advantaged provinces finally secure influence
over federal policymaking through Senate reform just as Ottawa surrenders the political will,
the fiscal capacity, and the international credibility that these provinces need.
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